








The effects on the market price of a change in the number of buyers, in the number of sellers, in the prices
sellers set and in the buyers’ reservation prices are established in a simple network model of a market.
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1. Introduction
The standard course of introductory microeconomics still hinges on Marshall’s (1966
[1920], pp. 276-291) modern version of the supply and demand model. The fact that the
direction of price changes can be easily predicted in this model (Figs. 24-29 in Marshall
(1966 [1920], pp. 385-386)) probably explains its success as a teaching model. For the
standard case of increasing supply function and decreasing demand function, the so-
called “market laws” hold that if the only change is an increase (decrease) in demand
(supply) then the market price increases and if the only change is a decrease (increase)
in supply (demand) then the market price decreases.
As a teaching model, the supply and demand model suffers nonetheless from some
significant shortcomings. One of them is the lack of a convincing dynamic explanation
of the underlying market mechanism. Specifically, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that
the market price changes with the textbook conventional interpretation of the model
according to which no agent in the market sets or alters the market price. In connection
with this difficulty, there is the unrealistic premise that the market price is unique.
When adopting this assumption, Marshall (1966 [1920], p. 284) himself was concerned
with the extent to which it was “in accordance with the actual facts of life”.
Network models of buyers and sellers provide an alternative to the supply and demand
model that can cope with the above difficulties; see, for instance, Kranton and Minehart
(2000, 2001) and Corominas-Bosch (2004). Though such models are more complex
than the supply and demand model, they are conceptually and descriptively more
satisfactory. Since there are grounds to believe that this type of model could replace the
supply and demand model as the reference market model for teaching purposes, it is
worth developing simple network models illustrating how this sort of model can
compete with the suply and demand model at the teaching level.
The aim of this note is to suggest one such model with the purpose of stating results
analogous to the “market laws” in the supply and demand model. The suggested model
adopts an extremely simple network perspective: the commodity is homogeneous,
buyers buy just one unit of the commodity, each seller sets his selling price and each
buyer has a reservation price, which determines the buyer’s network of potential sellers.
The novel aspect of the model is the definition of “the” market price: it is associated
with each buyer the average of prices in his network (understood as an expected price)
and next the market price is defined as the average of the buyers’ average price, so the
market price is an aggregation of subjective prices rather an objective entity.-3-
2. Model
Let a market for a certain commodity consists of a set S of s ³ 1 sellers and a set B of b
³ s buyers. Buyer i’s reservation price is ri > 0, whereas the price set by seller j is pj > 0.
Each buyer is assumed to be willing to buy just one unit of the commodity. For i Î B,
define Si := {j Î S: ri £ pj} to be the set of sellers from which buyer i could buy the unit
he is willing to buy. It is assumed that no reservation price is smaller than the minimum
price. Consequently, for all i Î B, Si ¹ Æ. Since each buyer i is supposed to be equally
likely to buy from any seller in Si, define pi := å




 to be the price i expects to pay in
order to obtain one unit of the commodity, where½G½denotes the number of members
of a finite set G. This presumes that each buyer i chooses one seller j Î Si (with every
such seller having the same probability of being chosen) and buys the unit of the
commodity from the chosen seller. Finally, by attributing the same weight to each





 be the average price representing the expected price
that a buyer chosen at random is expected to pay to obtain one unit of the commodity.
This P will represent the market price. If some shock changes the price from P to P',
define DP := P' – P. The results presented in Section 3 (see Section 4 for the proofs)
determine the effects on P of changes in: (i) the number of buyers; (ii) the number of
sellers; (iii) a buyer’s reservation price; and (iv) a seller’s price.
To illustrate the preceding definitions, consider the market with B = {1, 2, 3, 4} and S =
{1, 2, 3} such that, for i Î B, ri = i and, for j Î S, pj = j. In this case, S1 = {1}, S2 = {1,
2}, S3 = S4 = S, p1 = 1, p2 = 3/2, p3 = p4 = 2 and P := (p1 + p2 + p3 + p4) / 4 = 1.625.
3. Results
Choose any ordering (p1, p2, … , ps) of the set of prices {pj: j Î S} such that p1 £ p2 £ …
£ ps. Consider the sequence (a1, a2, … , as), where, for t Î {1, … , s}, at := (a1 + a2 + …
+ as) / t. With at being the first member in the sequence (a1, a2, … , as) such that at > P,
define r
+ := pt. The value r
+ corresponds to the price pj which is closest from above to
the average price P (in the example of Section 2, r
+ = 2.). The corresponding seller j
could be considered the “average” seller when prices close to P from above are regarded
as better approximations to P than prices close to P from below.
Proposition 1. Buyers entering and leaving the market. (a) If k Ï B is a new buyer
entering the market with reservation price rk then DP > 0 if, and only if, rk ³ r
+, where r
+-4-
is computed before k enters. (b) If k Î B is a buyer leaving the market then DP < 0 if,
and only if, rk ³ r
+, where r
+ is computed before k leaves.
By Proposition 1(a), when an additional buyer enters the market, the market price P
does not diminish if, and only if, the buyer’s reservation price is smaller than the
reservation price generating the subjective price that is closest to P from above.
Therefore, the incorporation of a new buyer will cause an increase in the market price if,
and only if, his reservation price is sufficiently high. This conforms with the
corresponding result in the supply and demand model: a buyer entering the market will
not affect the market price unless the maximum price he is willing to pay is sufficiently
high (in particular, above the equilibrium market price). Similarly, by Proposition 1(b),
for a buyer leaving the market to cause a reduction in the market price his reservation
price has to be sufficiently high (observe that causing a reduction in P by leaving the
market is equivalent to causing an increase in P by entering the market).
Proposition 2. Sellers entering and leaving the market. (a) If k Ï S is a new seller

















. (b) If, for all i Î B, Si has at least two members, k Î S is a seller leaving

















Proposition 2(a) states that, for the addition of a new seller to lower the market price,
the seller’s price should be sufficiently low. Proposition 2(b) expresses a symmetric
result: a seller leaving the market will not cause an increase in the market price unless
the seller’s price was sufficiently small. Those results also conform to the supply and
demand logic: if a new seller starts supplying for a sufficiently high price (above the
equilibrium price), his inclusion does not produce any effect on the equilibrium price.
Proposition 3. Sellers modifying their reservation prices. (a) DP ³ 0 if the reservation
price of a buyer increases. (b) DP £ 0 if the reservation price of a buyer decreases.
Proposition 3 is interesting in presenting clear-cut results: if a buyer i is willing to pay
more then his subjective price pi will never diminish (since his set Si either remains the
same, if the new reservation price does not allow i to buy from another seller, or is-5-
enlarged, if i can buy from another seller) and therefore the market price will
accordingly not diminish. Inversely if a buyer is willing to pay less.
Proposition 4. Buyers modifying their prices. If seller k’s price changes from pk to p'k
then define Dpk := p'k – pk and Ñpk := pk – p'k. (a) Suppose that, for all i Î B, Si has at
least two members. If seller k Î S increases his price from pk to p'k, C := {i Î B: p'k > ri


















seller k Î S reduces his price from pk to p'k, C := {i Î B: p'k £ ri < pk} and D := {i Î B: ri


















The subjective definition of market price adopted in this paper leads to the apparently
paradoxical results of Proposition 4: an increase (reduction) in a seller’s price will not
raise (lower) the market price unless the increase (reduction) is sufficiently high (small).
The reason is that a change in a seller’s price causes two opposite effects on P.
Consider, for instance, a reduction in seller k’s price pk. On the one hand, this reduction
induces lower subjective prices pi on those buyers that could previously buy from k
(namely, the set of buyers that belong to D) because they can now buy from k at a lower
price. But, on the other hand, there are those buyers (represented by the set C) that could
not buy from k before the reduction in pk but could buy from k after the reduction. For
these buyers, it could be that the new price p'k, despite being smaller than the initial pk,
is higher than their previous average subjective price, for which reason the new
subjective price could raise. The net result on P will depend on the relative strength of
these two effects. This relative strength in his turn will depend on the magnitude of the
change in the seller’s price. Proposition 4 identifies the magnitude of the changes that
guarantee one result or another.
As an example to illustrate the two effects on P of a reduction in a seller’s price, let S =
{1, 2, 3}, with p1 = 1, p2 = 2 and p3 = 4. Suppose that two buyers, 1 and 2, are such that
r1 = 4 and r2 = 3. If p3 is reduced from 4 to 3, then buyer 1’s expected price p1 is
reduced from 7/3 to 2, whereas buyer 2’s is raised from 3/2 to 2.-6-
4. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Let P be the average price before k enters the market and P'








if rk ³ r








k > P, so pk > P; and if rk < r








k  £ P and, hence, pk £ P. (b) Let P be the average price before k enters the
market and P' the price afterwards. Since DP < 0 if, and only if, pk > P, the result
follows from the fact that rk ³ r
+ implies pk > P and the fact that rk < r
+ implies pk £ P.
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) If P is the average price before k enters the market and P' the
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. (b) If P is the average
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Proof of Proposition 3. (a) Let P be the average price before k’s reservation price
increases, P' the price afterwards and similarly for pk, p'k, Sk and S'k . Clearly, DP > 0 Û
p'k > pk. With½S'k – Sk½= n, since Sk Í S'k and p'k :=  å
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, it follows that




S S' j j
S S'
p
k k \  > pk. That is, the average of the prices pj such that rk < pj £ r'k
(representing the new sellers from which k can buy after the increase in his reservation
price) is greater than his initial average price pk. But pk £ rk and, for each pj with j Î S'k-7-




S S' j j
S S'
p
k k \  > pk
and, accordingly, DP > 0. Conversely, DP > 0 requires an increase in rk such that S'k ¹




S S' j j
S S'
p
k k \  > pk. Finally, it is clear that an increase in rk such that
S'k = Sk is equivalent to DP = 0. (b) The proof is analogous to the one in case (a).
Proof of Proposition 4. Let P be the market price before the change in pk and P' the
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